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Abstract
Cognitive and behavioral biases, which are widespread among humans, have recently been demonstrated in other primates, suggesting
a common origin. Here we examine whether the expression of one shared bias, the endowment effect, varies as a function of context. We
tested whether objects lacking inherent value elicited a stronger endowment effect (or preference for keeping the object) in a context in
which the objects had immediate instrumental value for obtaining valuable resources (food). Chimpanzee subjects had opportunities to
trade tools when food was not present, visible but unobtainable, and obtainable using the tools. We found that the endowment effect for
these tools existed only when they were immediately useful, showing that the effect varies as a function of context-specific utility. Such
context-specific variation suggests that the variation seen in some human biases may trace predictably to behaviors that evolved to
maximize gains in specific circumstances.
© 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Cognitive biases; Behavioral biases; Endowment effect; Decision-making; Chimpanzee; Pan troglodytes; Human evolution

1. Introduction
Cognitive and behavioral biases are widespread among
humans. For example, we change our preferences as a
function of how choices are framed; we overly discount the
future; we fear a loss more than a missed opportunity for
equivalent gain; and we ascribe markedly different values to
the same item, depending on whether or not we own it
(Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002; Kahneman,
Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991a; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler,
1991b). Such biases are important to study, as they affect
decision-making and render modeling behavior based on the
common assumption of rationality quite difficult. Although
the roots of these biases are unknown, one possibility is that
⁎ Corresponding authors. S.F. Brosnan is to be contacted at: Georgia
State University, Department of Psychology, PO Box 5010, Atlanta, GA
30302 USA. Tel.: +1 404 413 6301. O.D. Jones: Vanderbilt University,
School of Law, 131 21st Avenue South, Nashville, TN 37203. Tel.: +1 615
322 7191.
E-mail addresses: sbrosnan@gsu.edu, sarah.brosnan@gmail.com
(S.F. Brosnan), owen.jones@vanderbilt.edu (O.D. Jones).
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they are based on evolved tendencies. If this is the case,
then these biases may be explicable and predictable,
reflecting previously unrecognized patterns (Gigerenzer,
2000; Gigerenzer, Todd, & Group, 1999; Haselton et al.,
2009; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Jones, 2001; Jones &
Goldsmith, 2005. See also McKay & Efferson, 2010, for a
discussion of the difference between cognitive and
behavioral biases, and when that distinction can matter.
For our purposes here, the distinction is immaterial.).
There is growing evidence that this is the case. Recent
discoveries of such biases in other primates, including the
endowment effect (Brosnan et al., 2007), loss aversion
(Chen, Lakshminarayanan, & Santos, 2006), and intergroup bias (Mahajan et al., 2011), suggest that some biases
persist because of the benefits they once provided (Jones,
2001; Jones & Brosnan, 2008). For instance, capuchin
monkeys making decisions in a scenario reminiscent of the
Asian Disease problem show behavior very much like that
of humans, preferring to minimize risk in the context of
loss, but preferring the opposite pattern in the context of
gains. Although the study of Chen et al. (2006) did not
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investigate this, the response is unlikely to be due to a
simple aversion to ambiguity, as chimpanzees and bonobos
are able to distinguish risk and ambiguity (Rosati & Hare,
2010). These are particularly relevant biases, as loss
aversion and the endowment effect are presumably linked
(Kahneman et al., 1991b).
The exchange-based endowment effect provides a ready
lens to test the adaptation hypothesis, both because it has
been documented widely, including in other species, and
because it is not language based, opening up myriad
experimental possibilities, including comparative studies.
The endowment effect is the phenomenon by which
individuals immediately begin to value what they have just
come to possess much more than they valued the same item
prior to the moment of possession (Franciosi, Kujal,
Michelitsch, Smith, & Deng, 1996; Kahneman, Knetsch, &
Thaler, 1990; Kahneman et al., 1991b). The phenomenon is
widespread in humans and is seen in other primates that have
been tested, including chimpanzees, orangutans, and capuchin monkeys (Brosnan et al., 2007; Flemming, Jones,
Stoinski, Mayo, & Brosnan, in review; Lakshminarayanan,
Chen, & Santos, 2008).
The underlying causes of this bias are widely debated in
the human literature. For example, as Korobkin (2003)
explained, some scholars speculate that the effect arises from
uncontrolled artifacts of the experimental setting, such as
strategic bargaining or unintended, but perceived, signals
within the experimental manipulation. Others question
whether the effect is caused by the role of personal wealth
in valuation processes (such as wealth effects or constraints
on liquid resources). Many believe that the effect is a
manifestation of “loss aversion” (and its cousins attachment,
regret avoidance, and the disutilities of selling; Camerer,
2005). Still others, attempting formal models, argue that
buying scenarios create significantly different expectations
and reference points than selling scenarios, and that these
differences are the root cause of the observed changes in
behavior (Koszegi & Rabin, 2006). Plott and Zeiler are
among the most vigorous critics of the idea that the observed
disjunctions between maximum buying and minimum
selling prices (which they argue can be altered by subtle
changes in experimental conditions) are in fact related to
“endowment” at all (Plott & Zeiler, 2007; Plott & Zeiler,
2005). And, as many have observed (e.g., Jones & Brosnan,
2008; Korobkin, 2003), there is far closer consensus on the
existence of an effect than there is on its underlying causes.
One of the critical drivers of this controversy about causes
—within economics, behavioral economics, psychology,
and law—is the widespread and seemingly unpredictable
variation in the effect (Sayman & Onculer, 2005). But if the
bias results from evolutionary processes, as the primate
studies suggest, rather than simply vagaries of experimental
design, then there should be some underlying consistency
with respect to the situations in which the effect emerges and
when it does not. If this is the case, then an understanding of
the underlying causes of this variation could illuminate
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previously hidden patterns in the human decision-making
architecture—not only with respect to the endowment effect,
but also with respect to the entire suite of biases.
It is one of these underlying causes that we investigate
here. One important feature of the endowment effect is that it
appears in the context of exchange. Such interactions are
inherently risky, as a willingness to exchange one item for a
preferred item possessed by a seemingly willing exchange
partner could instead result, through defection of the
exchange partner, in the loss of both items. Thus, one
reasonable hypothesis is that the effect should be greater in
contexts in which the risk of a partner's defection is higher.
This risk depends not only on the relationship between
partners, but also on the value of the object. Possessors may
be unlikely to give up a particularly valuable object, raising
the risk of defection. However, while these results do not test
this, it seems unlikely that this was an issue given our
procedure, in which experimenters reliably exchanged. In
addition, and what we examine in the current study, is the
value to the individual making the decision whether to
exchange. That is, if there is an evolutionary basis to this
effect, one would expect manifestations of the effect to vary
as a function of immediate usefulness of the object. A
specific prediction emerges from this hypothesis: the effect
should vary as a function of the instrumental value, or
usefulness, of the object at issue to the individual making the
decision to exchange (which affects the costs actually
incurred from failed exchanges and, hence, the overall risk).
In fact, previous studies of the endowment effect hint at
this possibility. The aforementioned study on chimpanzees
(Brosnan et al., 2007) was designed to replicate an earlier
study of humans by Knetch (1989), which compared one
group's preferences for a mug versus a chocolate bar to two
other groups' tendency to exchange when endowed with one
and given the option to exchange for the other. We
hypothesized that subjects would treat food and nonfood
items differently, given the extreme salience of food to
chimpanzees and the relative lack of interest in nonfood
objects (e.g., chimpanzees retain few nonfood items,
including tools, in their possession over extended periods;
Brosnan, 2011). Thus, we ran two different versions: one
using familiar preferred foods and one using familiar toys.
We found a strong endowment effect, within the range of
human studies, when using foods, but no endowment effect
when using nonfoods. In fact, in the latter case, the subjects
vastly preferred to trade, perhaps indicating a preference for
interaction with the human experimenter over the items
themselves. Although we could not rule out confounds such
as a general lack of interest in nonfoods, the results
nonetheless indicated the possibility that chimpanzees treat
food–food exchanges categorically differently from exchanges of nonfoods. Yet that study design did not allow us
to test the subtler possibility that endowment effects in
chimpanzees' might change for the same item (a nonfood)
depending on whether the item is situationally useful, for
instance, giving the chimpanzees an immediate ability to
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obtain food. Thus, the current study was designed to test the
hypothesis that chimpanzees' behavior would change for the
same nonfood item, a tool, depending on whether it could be
used to obtain food.
To do this, we followed a similar procedure to test the
endowment effect, but did so using the same pair of
(nonfood) objects in all conditions. This removed the
possibility that an inherent difference between the objects
caused any difference in the subjects' responses. These
objects were tools that could be used to obtain a specific
food (juice or sweetened oatmeal), but neither of which
could be used to obtain the other food. These tool pairs
were tested in three situations: one in which neither food
was available or visible (i.e., the tools could not be used to
obtain food), one in which both foods were both visible and
available (i.e., the tools were both useful), and one in
which both foods were visible but not reachable. This latter
controlled for the possibility that the very presence of food
might change subject preferences, which was particularly
important since the tools are secondary reinforcers that
might have been treated similarly to the foods they could
acquire (Breland & Breland, 1961), even when those foods
were not actually accessible.
This design removed a number of confounds. First, as
mentioned previously, the fact that the same pair of objects
was tested in all three cases removed the possibility that
some difference other than the tool's usefulness affected
their responses. Second, the fact that neither tool could be
used to obtain the other food removed the possibility that
they would consider one tool “good enough” for either food
and thus be disinclined to exchange. Third, the control
situation, in which foods were visible but not available,
allowed us to rule out the possibility that it was the presence
of foods that caused any response, rather than the usefulness
of the objects themselves.
Finally, human studies universally utilize between-subjects designs to compare group-level preferences, obscuring
any data on individuals' behavior in such tasks. These data
may be very important; an effect at the group level could be
due to a few individual's preferences rather than to a
consistent response across all members of the group. Thus,
we used a within-subjects design, common in primate
studies, with each condition tested in counterbalanced order
on each subject. In this way, we got a measure of the number
of individuals who showed behavior consistent with an
endowment effect. In order to better compare our results to
those from human studies, we also analyzed the change in
the groups' mean behavior between each condition.
Thus, the current study specifically addressed the role of
how an object's immediate usefulness affected the endowment effect by using exchange items, tools, which varied in
whether they could be immediately used to obtain food, but
were otherwise identical between conditions. We hypothesized that the tool's situational value would influence the
endowment effect. Specifically, we predicted a stronger
endowment effect when tools were useful (i.e., when both

foods were available) than when the tools were not useful
(either because the food was absent, or it was present but not
available). Secondarily, we utilized both individual- and
group-level analyses to best understand the variation within
chimpanzees, as well as how these results compared to those
of humans.

2. Methods
2.1. Participants
Participants were 20 adult chimpanzees (10 male, 10
female) housed at the Michale E. Keeling Center for
Comparative Medicine and Research of The University of
Texas MD Anderson Cancer Center. Chimpanzees were
housed in social groups in large outdoor enclosures with
climbing structures, toys, and additional enrichment. Each
outdoor compound also included an indoor area of dens,
where all testing took place. Subjects received biscuits and
water ad libitum and four daily enrichment meals.
Subjects were already proficient at exchanging objects
with a human for a food reward. This was essential for the
task, as subjects who were disinclined to exchange would
artificially inflate the results indicative of an endowment
effect. Thus, prior to commencing the study, we verified that
each subject would exchange with the human experimenter.
All subjects completed a session of exchange with the
experimenter in which they were required to return an object
10 times in a row. All subjects passed this pretest.
Because the experiment involved tools, it was also
important to verify that each chimpanzee could use each
tool equally proficiently. To ensure subjects understood the
task and tools, we chose two ecologically relevant tasks they
experienced routinely as part of their regular enrichment.
The first task was a dipping task in which subjects could use
a stick to obtain oatmeal (similar to a honey dipping task),
and the second was a sponging task in which subjects could
use paper wads to obtain juice (details of both are below). All
subjects received a series of sessions in which they were
given both of the tasks individually, with the appropriate
tool, to verify that they could use the tool to obtain the
appropriate food.
2.2. Tools
Items for exchange consisted of two tools: a sponge that
could be used to obtain juice (50% grape juice, 50% water)
and a dipstick that could be used to obtain oatmeal (instant
maple brown sugar flavor). These foods were chosen
because pilot testing using chimpanzees that were not a
part of the study (to avoid differential exposure to the objects
prior to testing) showed similar preferences for the two. The
sponge consisted of an approximately 30×40-cm piece of
absorbent butcher paper that chimpanzees wadded and
dipped into juice available in a trough outside of their
enclosure. The dipstick was a cardboard lollipop stick
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approximately 29 cm in length that could be dipped in the
hole of the oatmeal container to obtain oatmeal. The oatmeal
container was also located outside of the subjects' enclosure,
and its hole was too small to admit fingers or any tool other
than the provided stick. Neither food could be obtained
without the appropriate tool or with the alternate tool.
2.3. Procedure
Tests were divided into three Treatments of three tests
each. In the first Treatment (the Absent Treatment), no food
was present during any of the four tests. In the second
Treatment (the Unobtainable Treatment), both foods were
visible and present, but beyond the chimpanzees' reach
during all four tests. Thus, subjects could clearly see the
foods, but were unable to use the tools to access them. After
the completion of the subjects' session, foods were removed
without the chimpanzees having access to them, so they had
no expectation that rewards would be available at a later
time. In the third Treatment (the Obtainable Treatment), both
foods were present and obtainable with the corresponding
tool during all tests. Note that in the Unobtainable and
Obtainable Treatments, both foods were always present
simultaneously and for the duration of the test; the difference
lay in whether the foods could be accessed. The Absent
Treatment control was run twice, prior to each of the other
two Treatments, to verify that the subjects' behavior toward
the tools did not change with the experience provided in the
first Treatment in which food was present.
Each Treatment consisted of a Preference Condition and
two Endowment Conditions. In the Preference Condition,
subjects were given a simultaneous choice between the two
tools and indicated their preference by reaching for their
preferred item. Tools were presented on a predetermined
side, which was counterbalanced across chimpanzees. The
experimenter held both objects out, approximately 20 cm
apart and at eye level to the chimpanzee, and called the
chimpanzee's attention to them. Once the chimpanzee
was watching, the experimenter moved both objects
forward to within 5 cm of the caging. Subjects could
indicate their preference by reaching with their hand or
their pursed lips (some subjects had previously been
trained to accept foods with their lips and so were
allowed to indicate preference however they preferred).
Whichever object they reached for was then given to
them (Brosnan & de Waal, 2004).
In the Endowment Conditions, subjects were given a
predetermined tool and then given the option to keep it or
exchange it for another. The experimenter again held both
tools out, at the chimpanzee's eye level, approximately 20 cm
away and called the chimpanzee's attention to them. Once
the chimpanzee was watching, the experimenter handed
the predetermined tool to the chimpanzee. The experimenter then offered an exchange immediately (as is typical
in human endowment effect experiments) with the second
tool in her right hand (it was moved to the right hand if it
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was not already there; object presentation was counterbalanced) and moved it forward to within 5 cm of the
caging. At the same time, the experimenter held her left
hand out, palm up, at the chimpanzee's chest level, the cue
that is always used to offer an exchange. The experimenter
did not use any words or cues (e.g., a clicker) that might
have indicated that the chimpanzee was expected to
exchange. Subjects had the opportunity to exchange until
they used the tool or 30 s elapsed, whichever came first
(Brosnan et al., 2007). In practice, the subject always
either exchanged or used the tool within a few seconds.
Thus, for the Dipstick Endowment Condition, subjects
were endowed with the dipstick and could exchange for
the sponge; in the Sponge Endowment Condition, subjects
were endowed with the sponge and could exchange for the
dipstick. Again, whenever foods were present (e.g., the
Obtainable and Unobtainable Treatments), both foods were
available simultaneously in all three of the Conditions, so
subjects had access to both—or neither—simultaneously.
Treatments were presented in a set order, but the three
conditions were randomized for each subject within each
Treatment. Subjects first completed the Absent Treatment
(as an initial control) followed by the Obtainable Treatment.
To verify that obtaining a food did not change their
preferences, subjects were given a second Absent Treatment
followed by the Unobtainable Treatment; results did not
differ between the Absent Treatments (Wilcoxon signed
ranks tests: preference: T+=6, n=10, p=.527; endowed
sponge: T+=1, n=3, p=.564; endowed dipstick: T+=0, n=1,
p=.317), so these Treatments were combined for most
analyses (exceptions are indicated).
Each of the 20 subjects completed a series of 12 tests,
with each test completed on a different day. Thus, subjects
had only a single choice a day. In order to minimize
possible effects of habituation, subjects typically received
two to three choices per week. Subjects were tested
between 10:30 and 15:30, and no testing occurred prior to
the first enrichment feeding of the day (primate chow and
water were available ad libitum). In this way, all subjects
had had access to preferred foods prior to their day's
choice, regardless of when they were tested. Tests consisted
of one session each of the Available and Unobtainable
Treatments, each of which consisted of three Conditions,
and two of the Absent Treatments, also consisting of three
Conditions, with one Absent Treatment before each of the
other two Treatments.
2.4. Individual-level vs. group-level analyses
This methodology was based on a human design.
However, one weakness of the human literature on the
endowment effect is that results are virtually always
compared across groups (i.e., a between-subjects design),
rather than within individuals (i.e., a within-subjects design).
For example, while humans are known to maintain
possession of objects at higher levels than expected due to
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their preferences, those preferences were obtained from a
different group of individuals. Group-level analysis obscures
variation and does not allow analysis of individual trends.
Previous research on 32 chimpanzees indicated that
while the group-level effect (i.e., the group-level change in
preference, the typical level of analysis for human studies)
was similar to that seen in humans, there was quite a lot of
variation in individuals' behavior (Brosnan et al., 2007).
Thus, we analyzed the current data in two ways. First, we
assessed how many chimpanzees actually showed an
endowment effect. For this, we assessed whether each
individual showed behavior consistent with an endowment
effect, retaining possession of tools despite his or her
separately expressed preference, and then analyzed whether
the distribution of individuals with each of the four possible
outcomes (see below) differed from chance. To do this,
each chimpanzee was given a score of 1 (exchanged neither
tool; the only outcome strongly indicative of an endowment
effect), 2 (exchanged both tools; indicative of a preference
for interaction), 3 (exchanged the preferred tool, while
keeping the nonpreferred tool; behavior inconsistent with
preferences), or 4 (exchanged the nonpreferred tool, while
keeping the preferred tool; behavior consistent with
preferences). Although there could in theory be some
behavior reflecting an endowment effect hidden within
conditions 3 and 4, the most rigorous test, which we
employed, is to consider as evidence of an endowment
effect only those cases in which individuals refused to
exchange both tools. This avoids the possibility of
considering individuals who were potentially disinterested
in the task (outcome 3) or were simply following their
preferences, with no influence of possession on the strength
of those preferences (outcome). We then did a Friedman's
test to see if there was variation across the group in their
behavior. Considering the data in this way allowed us to
more fully quantify what happens at the individual level.
Second, we assessed the percent change in preference
between Conditions due to the Treatments across the entire
group of chimpanzees tested. That is, considering the mean
responses, were chimpanzees, on average, more likely to
exchange than would be anticipated based on the mean
preference results? While we believe that this latter
approach is less informative, it did allow us to compare
these results to those of humans.
2.5. Analysis
Since the sample size of chimpanzees was only 20, we
used nonparametric statistics for all analyses. Comparisons
across multiple dimensions were done using Friedman's
tests, which take into account repeated measures, and paired
comparisons were done using the Wilcoxon signed ranks
test. In Wilcoxon tests, the reported sample sizes (ns)
differed from 20 due to ties, which are not considered in the
calculation of the final statistic. Significance was considered
to be pb.05. All statistical tests were two-tailed.

3. Results
3.1. Effect of Treatments and Conditions on chimpanzees'
exchange behavior
There was a strong effect of Treatment on behavior, with
subjects behaving differently in the Obtainable than in the
other two Treatments. Specifically, despite the data from our
initial preference tests with chimpanzees not used in the
study (to avoid contamination) that indicated similar
preferences for the two tools, the experimental subjects
preferred the sponge over the dipstick in all conditions.
Nonetheless, the preference was significantly stronger in the
Obtainable Treatment as compared to the other two
Treatments (preference for sponge; Absent: 70%, Unobtainable: 70%, Obtainable: 100%; χ22=7.74, p=.025).
Considering the Endowment Conditions, in both the
dipstick-endowed and sponge-endowed Conditions, subjects
exchanged significantly less often in the Obtainable
Treatment than in the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments
indicating a stronger preference to keep whichever tool they
had been given when food was currently available
(frequency with which subjects exchanged the dipstick for
the sponge; Absent: 97.5%, Unobtainable: 100%, Obtainable: 55%; Friedman's test: χ22=25.83, pb.001; frequency
with which the subjects exchanged the sponge for the
dipstick; Absent: 72.5%, Unobtainable: 80%, Obtainable:
15%; χ22=22.81, pb.001). In other words, subjects were
significantly more likely to exchange the tool for another
when food was not currently accessible. However, if food
was available (i.e., the Obtainable Treatment), chimpanzees
instead preferred to keep whichever tool they received,
regardless of whether it was the sponge or the dipstick.
3.2. How many chimpanzees show the endowment effect?
We first examined how individuals behaved. Despite the
prevalence of group-based measures in the human literature
(see below for group-based measures in this study to allow
for comparison with humans' results), we felt that an
individual approach was more appropriate approach as it
uncovered variation hidden in a group-level analysis as well
as opening future possibilities to study how other factors
may interact with the response at the individual (rather than
group) level. In our study, each individual could display one
of four behaviors: (1) exchanged neither tool, (2) exchanged
both tools, (3) exchanged only the preferred tool, or (4)
exchanged only the nonpreferred tool. The first behavior is
the only one that indicated an endowment effect.
Individuals' exchange behavior varied significantly
across the different Treatments. In the Absent and Unobtainable Treatments, in which food was not available, more than
70% of individuals exchanged both tools, a significantly
greater percentage than for any of the other three possibilities
(Absent 1: χ22=9.70, p=.008; Absent 2: χ22=15.7, pb.001;
Unobtainable: χ22=19.90, pb.001, Fig. 1). No individual kept
both tools (the behavioral option most consistent with an
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Fig. 1. Individually, subjects were least likely to keep a tool in the Absent and
Unobtainable Treatments, and never showed an endowment effect (i.e., never
kept both items). However, in the Obtainable Treatment, subjects typically
either kept both tools (revealing an endowment effect) or kept their preferred
tool. X-axis labels indicate whether subjects kept or exchanged the tools.

endowment effect) in either of these Treatments. In contrast,
in the Obtainable Treatment, a third of subjects (33%)
showed behavior consistent with an endowment effect,
keeping both objects. Moreover, while only approximately
10% of subjects even kept their preferred tool in the Absent
and Unobtainable Treatments, half of subjects (50%) did so
in the Obtainable Treatment (the sponge was preferred for all
subjects; χ22 =10.80, p=.013), which could potentially
indicate a stronger endowment effect in the latter context.
Finally, in contrast to the previous two Treatments, in which
70% of subjects exchanged both items, fewer than 5% of
subjects did so in the Obtainable Treatment.
Thus, when the tools are immediately useful, we found
evidence for an endowment effect in approximately one third
of our subjects, as compared to none in either of the two
Treatments in which food was not immediately available. In
comparison, in previous work, we found that 42% of
chimpanzees showed evidence of an endowment effect for
foods, while b5% (one subject) did so for nonuseful
nonfoods (in that case, toys that could not be used to obtain
food; Brosnan et al., 2007). Thus, these results were very
consistent when comparing conditions both within studies as
well as across studies. Moreover, we found additional
evidence that subjects were sensitive to the presence or
absence of food; in the Obtainable Treatment, most of the
rest of the subjects showed the exchange behavior that is
expected based on their preferences, while the vast majority
exchanged in all circumstances in the other two Treatments.
3.3. Group-level presence of the endowment effect
There are remarkably few human studies of the
endowment effect that have reported individual data (the
most definitive meta-analysis of endowment effect studies,
Sayman & Oncluler, 2005, identified only two human
studies that reported results from within-subject designs; this
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reflects the concern that, in humans, any past experience with
a given exchangeable good could confound a person's future
valuation of that good). Thus, while we considered this
group-level analysis less informative than the previous,
individual results, we here report the results of a group-level
analysis based on the subjects' mean responses in order to
compare these results to those of humans. For this analysis,
we compared whether the subjects' mean responses differed
across the three Treatments, as is typically done in human
studies. To do so, we compared the group-level tendency to
keep objects initially given in the Endowment Conditions to
the group-level preferences expressed in the Preference
Condition. Again, subjects as a group behaved very
differently in the Obtainable Treatment than in the other
two Treatments, in which food was not obtainable.
Comparing the difference between the Preference and
Endowment Conditions across all three Treatments, we
found that subjects were much more likely to keep each of
the tools in the Obtainable Treatment than in the Absent and
Unobtainable Treatments (Friedman's test, sponge: χ22=19.6,
pb.001; dipstick: χ22=16.222, pb.001).
Specifically, in the Absent Treatments, subjects were
significantly less likely than predicted to keep either tool,
based on the group-level behavior in the preference tests.
Twice as many subjects exchanged the sponge in the
Endowment Condition as expected based on the preference
test results (Fig. 2: 70% vs. 27.5%; Wilcoxon signed rank
test Absent 1: T+=3, N=13, p=.052; Absent 2: T+=0,
N=10, p=.002), and 12 times as many exchanged the
dipstick as expected (30% vs. 2.5%; Absent 1: T+=1, N=14,
p=.001; Absent 2: T+=0, N=15, pb.001). Despite the fact
that food was present, if unreachable, in the Unobtainable
Treatment, three times as many subjects exchanged the
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Fig. 2. The percent of subjects who chose to keep the endowed tool (e.g.,
rather than exchange for the other tool; Endowment Condition) versus the
percent of subjects who chose the tool in a choice task (Preference
Condition). When given the opportunity to exchange, subjects were less
likely to keep a given tool (hatched bars) in the Absent and Unobtainable
Treatments than indicated by their preference (solid bars). They were equally
or more likely to keep a tool in the Obtainable Treatment (Absent Treatments
are combined). SP: sponge; DS: dipstick. The Y-axis indicates the percent of
subjects who chose the tool in the Preference Condition and the percent of
subjects who retained the tool in the Endowment Condition.

384

S.F. Brosnan et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 33 (2012) 378–386

sponge in the Endowment Condition as expected based on
the Preference Condition (70% vs. 20%; T+=12, N=14,
p=.008), and all subjects exchanged the dipstick, despite
preferring it to the sponge only 30% of the time in the
Preference Condition (30% vs. 0%; T+=0, N=14, pb.001).
Thus, in these two conditions, in which food could not be
accessed, subjects were actually more likely to exchange
than their preferences indicate.
In sharp contrast, in the Obtainable Treatment, subjects
showed a reduced tendency to exchange either object. As
opposed to the other two Treatments, chimpanzees kept the
dipstick 45% of the time (i.e., exchanged it 55% of the time),
despite never choosing it when given the choice (Preference
Condition: 45% vs. 0%; T+=0, N=11, p=.001) and
exchanging it every single time in the Unobtainable
Treatment. These results indicate a strong endowment effect.
Unfortunately, despite our efforts to choose tools of equal
value based on pilot testing of nonsubject chimpanzees,
subjects used in the experiment showed a strong preference
for the sponge. While this does not preclude an endowment
effect, it did lead to a ceiling effect; although subjects
kept the sponge on every single trial in the Obtainable
Treatment, the mean was not significantly higher than in
the Preference Condition (100% vs. 85%; T+=0, N=3,
p=.083). Nonetheless, the trend was in the direction of an
endowment effect.

4. Discussion
We found that the endowment effect varies markedly as
a function of an object's immediate usefulness, a phenomenon that has not been previously demonstrated and may
serve to explain some of the variability in the strength of the
effect in both humans and other species. This bias in
chimpanzees changed dramatically depending on whether
tools that otherwise lacked inherent value could be used at
the time of possession to obtain food. Specifically, when
foods were either not present at all or present but
unobtainable, subjects manifested no endowment effect for
the tools. However, as predicted, when food was present
and available, chimpanzees showed robust endowment
effects for the very same tools; that is, they refused to
exchange both tools, their less preferred as well as their
more preferred. Importantly, this bias varied not as a
function of the mere presence of the food, but rather it was
entirely contingent on the current possibility of using the
tools to obtain food. These findings support the hypothesis
that the endowment effect is the result of evolutionary
pressures to maximize outcomes during inherently risky
exchange interactions. In situations in which there was
much to lose, exchange may have been too risky, leading to
a tendency to hold on to a less preferred object even when a
more preferred one is offered in exchange.
Thus, our data indicate that the variation seen in the
endowment effect is predictable based on at least one factor:

whether the object is useful in the current context. The fact
that this variation is consistent and can be predicted based on
features external to the experimental procedure supports the
conclusion that this situational dependence evolved to
maximize outcomes in different situations (Todd &
Gigerenzer, 2007) and that the context of the interaction—
in this case, the object's usefulness—is at least as important
as the actual act of possession. Thus, when considering the
endowment effect, a specific bias, it may often be just as
important to attend to the situation as it is to attend to the mere
state of possession. That is, endowment may be a piece of the
puzzle, but an endowment in a context lacking immediate
usefulness may not evoke the bias.
These data extend previous findings indicating that
endowment effects in great apes can differ as a function of
the object at issue, as is true in humans (Brosnan et al., 2007;
Flemming et al., in review). Given the potential to trade food
items in a similar design to this study, both chimpanzees and
orangutans showed an endowment effect of roughly
equivalent magnitude to that seen in some human studies.
As predicted, this was not true for toys. However, those
studies confounded salience with other possibilities, such as
categorical differences in interest in the two types of items.
The present study disentangles these possibilities and, more
importantly, shows that the endowment effect can actually
shift for the same item dependent upon whether the item is
useful in a given situation. Thus, the present results cannot be
explained by differences in preference between types of
items, but can be explained by changes in item usefulness as
situations change.
As with previous data on chimpanzees, our data also
indicate that this effect can be the result of only a subset of
the group displaying the behavior. There are several
possibilities for this individual variation. First, endowment
effects are likely to vary in strength between individuals,
based on either (or both) innate predispositions or previous
experience. Second, while we have relative preference data
between these two tools for all individuals, it may be that
some individuals had stronger or weaker preferences than
others, or that they got differential enjoyment out of the
task. Of course, the most critical point is that these effects
appear across multiple species, including humans (Brosnan
et al., 2007; Flemming et al., in review; Lakshminarayanan
et al., 2008). Thus, while it may be that the effect does not
appear in all individuals or in all situations, this does not
contraindicate a selective benefit for the bias. The fact that
a behavior has evolved due to selective pressure does not
mean that it must manifest at every opportunity, nor does
the fact that a behavior occasionally may not be beneficial
make it any less likely to evolve. Nonetheless, one very
important implication of these findings is the need for
additional research on individual-level endowment effects
among humans.
Virtually all studies report group-based differences from
between-subjects designs, precluding any investigation of
individuals' behavior. However, our results indicate that
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endowment effects on the magnitude of those seen in
humans can be the result of only some individuals' behavior.
Future research in humans is needed to determine the relative
contribution of individuals. Such studies will also help to
clarify how individual factors such as experience, culture,
personality, etc., affect cognitive biases, necessary steps to
effectively address them. For instance, given that the
endowment effect is hypothesized to have evolved in the
context of risky trade situations, an obvious hypothesis is
that the strength of the endowment effect in an individual
should correlate with the individual's relative risk sensitivity,
with more risk-sensitive individuals displaying the endowment effect in more situations. Hypotheses such as these
cannot be tested with the current group-level approach that is
common amongst human studies.
These data, in concert with those from the previous
studies, indicate that suites of cognitive and behavioral
biases in humans cannot be adequately explained by
inevitable constraints on decision-making (such as limitations on cognitive processing power, processing time, etc.;
Conlisk, 1996) or by any psychological phenomenon limited
to humans themselves. Humans are not the only species to
show biases, indicating that these behaviors likely evolved
prior to the human split from other species. This has two
implications. First, it is clear that we can learn about the
development and function of biases from studying their
prevalence and distribution in other species. Such a
comparative approach provides a broader background, as
well as an opportunity to investigate these behaviors
removed from modern human culture.
Second, the widespread presence of endowment effects
as well as other behaviors (e.g., loss aversion), indicates
that these are not quirks that require justification, but
instead are robust features that evolved in primates (at a
minimum—even amoebas show “irrational” behavior in
some contexts; Latty & Beekman, 2010). Such prevalence
is unlikely if these behaviors were not specifically selected
due to their beneficial results. In other species, it is likely
very risky to trade an object away because, without a skill
such as language, it is difficult or impossible to police
interactions and to eliminate cheaters (Brosnan, in press;
Brosnan & Beran, 2009; Brosnan, Grady, Lambeth,
Schapiro, & Beran, 2008). Humans have used language
to develop extensive control mechanisms (e.g., the system
of law enforcement, the court system) that provide an
unprecedented opportunity for an individual to interact
with others with less fear of his or her partner cheating.
Thus, while the endowment effect seems illogical and
even detrimental in modern Western societies, it was
likely essential to earlier humans, as well as other species.
This is not to say that this does not require further
investigation. From the broader perspective, understanding
the contexts likely to elicit the endowment effect is
important for two reasons.
First, in humans, this bias has far-reaching legal and
social implications because vast personal and market
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transactions involve exchanges in, and sales of, goods
and rights. Regulators may assume that goods and rights
will ultimately end up in the hands of those who value
them the most (at least when transaction costs are minimal;
Coase, 1960), making end distributions relatively insensitive to initial distributions. But endowment effects can
make goods and rights “sticky”—that is, likely to stay in
the hands of those into whose hands they happen to first
get. In such cases, endowment effects can undermine
efficient markets and allocations in goods and rights (Jolls,
Sunstein, & Thaler, 1998; Korobkin, 2003). Second, as
argued earlier (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Haselton et al.,
2009; Jones, 2001; Jones & Brosnan, 2008; Jones &
Goldsmith, 2005), the ability to use an evolutionary
perspective to predict novel, specific, context-dependent
variation in one bias suggests that the same may be true for
others as well. A better appreciation for the evolution of
these behavioral predispositions may illuminate their
function (i.e., the reason natural selection favored them),
which in turn will help with predictions of the situations
and contexts in which various biases can—or cannot—be
expected to emerge.
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